While you're there read on through the periodista entry. You were probably thinking of emitter follower.
Planning process[ edit ] While much of the United States' nuclear war planning process remains classified, some information on the former SIOP planning Maos domestic policies essay has been made public. The planning process began with the President issuing a presidential directive establishing the concepts, goal, and guidelines that provided guidance to the nuclear planners.
The number of targets in the NTB varied over time, from 16, in to 12, at the end of the Cold War into 2, by The "plan" actually contains multiple "attack options" that are themselves complex plans. Early targeting after the Second World War[ edit ] Main articles: Berlin Blockade and Korean War There is no evidence that the Soviet Union's contingency plans from the end of World War II to were anything but routine and defensive, and the substantial postwar demobilization of the Soviet military supports the view that the USSR did not view a new war in Europe as likely.
Although Soviet doctrine incorporated an assumption of innate hostility of the capitalist powers to Communism, Soviet leader Josef Stalin apparently believed that neither the USSR nor the West could afford to fight another world war, and was skeptical of the Western ability to raise an army large enough to occupy Soviet territory.
Soviet planning thus emphasized defenses against nuclear bombing, and attacks on Western European bomber bases. Plans in and assumed that during war with an unspecified enemy, Soviet forces in Germany Maos domestic policies essay assume defensive positions within the Soviet occupation zone and wait for reinforcements before counterattacking.
While the United States was the only nation with the atomic bomb, in it had only 17 Silverplate B bombers and 11 atomic bombs. Many early American war plans were based on using hundreds of nonexisting weapons; for example, an autumn plan envisioned using atomic bombs on Soviet industrial targets, but SAC could not deliver such quantities until Although the Soviets launched an intensive public relations effort inaided by sympathetic Western European fellow travelersto oppose the formation of NATO, the new alliance's military strength was so weak that the Politburo did not bother to discuss it for six months after its formation.
Due in part to the lack of updated intelligence, nuclear planning increasingly focused on urban areas, which were easier to target and offered the potential for "bonus damage".
Truman hoped for an international ban on atomic weapons and believed that the American people would not support their use for "aggressive purposes", and ordered JCS to devise a plan for conventional war; however, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in July ordered it to stop and resume atomic war planning due to the Berlin crisis.
Britain's SPEEDWAY plan assumed that the Soviets would not have atomic weapons, but nonetheless forecast that the West could not "withstand a Russian advance in Western Europe, even with the full defence co-operation of the Western Powers", including American and British atomic-capable bombers. A committee led by General Hubert R.
Harmon reported in May that even if all precisely hit their targets, the USSR would not surrender, its leadership would not be seriously weakened, and its military could still operate in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
One estimate foresaw combat divisions allegedly prepared to simultaneously attack Western Europe, the United Kingdom, the Balkans, the Middle East, and North America.
The gambit backfired, however; despite their initial optimism the Communists were unable to defeat the US-led forces in Korea, and the war greatly increased Western military spending, for the first time making NATO a significant threat against the Soviets in Europe.
By latethe USSR notified its Eastern European satellites to prepare for war by the end ofa date matching Western estimates.
In earlybased on an alleged NATO plan to launch a European war that year from Western proxy Yugoslavia as a response to its defeat in Korea, he ordered a massive increase in Eastern European forces that hurt the weaker Communist economies.
Based on the Korean precedent, the Soviets apparently expected that the West would not use atomic weapons in a European war.
During Stalin's lifetime, Soviet doctrine foresaw the next war as a more destructive version of World War II similarly decided by giant armies supported by massive home fronts, a type of conflict which benefited from the Soviet Union's innate strengths.
The Soviets assumed that Western forces were ready to invade and that Eastern Europeans would see them as liberators; as in the West, the Soviets overestimated their enemies' strength.
JCS decided to emphasize "the destruction of known targets affecting the Soviet capability to deliver atomic bombs", with refineries, chemical and power plants, and shipyards as secondary and tertiary targets.
Brodie later recalled that "There was no calculated strategy for destroying Soviet capability to make war. The planners "simply expected the Soviet Union 'to collapse' as a result of the bombing campaign People kept talking about the ' Sunday punch '.
LeMay objected to the list because of the difficulty of attacking isolated targets and the requirement for pre-attack reconnaissance for many of them.
He preferred attacking industrial targets in urban areas so that even if a bomb missed, "a bonus will be derived from the use of the bomb".
Massive retaliation By the end ofSAC would have 1, nuclear-capable bombers and was deploying the B jet bomber.
In JanuaryDwight D. Eisenhower inherited the Truman administration's large defense budget.
The administration believed that they would be useful both during a general war and to deter a local one in Europe,  and Eisenhower said of tactical weapons that "on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else".
Similarly, the Soviet doctrine of non-atomic warfare began to change after Stalin's death in March In September that year a general proposed in a military journal that new weaponry might end a war quickly unlike World War II, and in October the Soviet Army held its first military exercise based on the enemy using atomic weapons.
In Soviet forces in Europe received their first tactical atomic weapons, by which time Soviet officers publicly debated in the journal the merits of preemptive war.
Preventive warPreemptive warand Pre-emptive nuclear strike Many in the West also seriously discussed the idea of preventive and preemptive war.
Truman rejected preventive war, stating that "[s]tarting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men", but Attlee stated in that "twice is he armed who gets in the first blow". JCS proposed in that the president be authorized to use atomic bombs to prevent a nuclear attack.
NSC 68 of April opposed "a military attack not provoked by a military attack on us or on our allies", but acknowledged "if possible" the benefits of preemptively "landing the first blow" before the Soviet Union did so.
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed that month their fears that, once the Soviets acquired fusion weapons, the resulting situation might force the United States into either war or dictatorship.
The Central Intelligence Agency believed that it could warn of a surprise Soviet attack days or even weeks ahead of time because of the necessary preparation time, and that up to 30 days would be needed to deliver all Soviet weapons.The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was the United States' general plan for nuclear war from to The SIOP gave the President of the United States a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched.
The plan integrated the capabilities of the nuclear triad of strategic bombers, land-based. A very perceptive, interesting piece as usual by Ramin Mazaheri; thank you. What’s especially heinous about China’s opium addiction en masse is that it was the result of Britain’s all-out rape and enslavement rule in India, where people were starved to death by the millions.
Really, the peasants harvesting the opium there were exploited to the utmost. Domestic Policies of Mao and Stalin Let us compare the domestic policies imposed on their countries by Mao Zedong, the leader of the People’s Republic of China, and Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union.
As part of Mao's continuous revolution he set extremely high targets. The harvest was good and resulted in inflated targets for and Due to overtaxation and a bad harvest, a famine resulted, killing in excess of 20 million.
No Dared criticise Mao's Plan, . The focus of this essay is to establish whether Mao achieved this goal with his domestic policies. The effect of the civil war on China was that there was major instability in the Country.
Mao knew it and one of his major concerns in order to achieve his goals was to even out this insecurity. The Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-Care Settings provides health-care workers (HCWs) with a review of data regarding handwashing and hand antisepsis in health-care settings.
In addition, it provides specific recommendations to promote improved hand-hygiene practices and reduce transmission of.